Shalkowski, S. and Daly, C. (Accepted: 2025) The Prolix and the Pleonastic. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. ISSN: 2053-4477 (In Press)
Abstract
Philosophical analysis has long involved finding the “proper” form of a sentence, aiming to find a form that is “transparent” regarding its implications. Easy ontologists that finding the tacit ontological commitments of ordinary claims about the world is easy. Simple paraphrases and elementary deductions from those paraphrases will do, they claim. We find the easy ontologists’ arguments wanting. After examining the natures of idioms and paraphrase, we conclude that the so-called easy arguments provide no warrant for ontological conclusions as they have traditionally understood. In several illustrative examples, we show that the easy ontologists preferred paraphrases are apt only if they carry no ontological implications, on pain of warranting ontological conclusions that are not credible.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | metaontology, paraphrase, nominalism, deflationism, ontology, pleonastic entities |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 11 Aug 2025 11:57 |
Last Modified: | 11 Aug 2025 16:20 |
Status: | In Press |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:230241 |