Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion

Abstract

I investigate syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence between logical theories and an recent objection thereto. I show that this recent criticism of syntactic accounts as extensionally inadequate is unwarranted by developing an account which is plausibly extensionally adequate and more philosophically motivated. This is important for recent anti-exceptionalist treatments of logic since syntactic accounts require less theoretical baggage than semantic accounts.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Woods III, JE https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8144-0910
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2018 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Woods III, JE (2018) Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1). pp. 58-68, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.269. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Keywords:	Philosophy of logic; Theoretical Equivalence; Revising Logic; Anti-exceptionalism; intuitionistic logic; non-classical logic
Dates:	Published: 13 March 2018 Published (online): 14 February 2018 Accepted: 10 December 2017
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	17 Jan 2018 14:11
Last Modified:	14 Feb 2020 01:38
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Wiley
Identification Number:	10.1002/tht3.269
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:126339

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Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion

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