Elliott, EJR orcid.org/0000-0002-4387-7967 (2017) Ramsey Without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem. Mind, 126 (501). pp. 1-51. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
Frank Ramsey's ‘Truth and Probability’ sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a (somewhat incomplete) representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey's formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout Ramsey's system. A number of later representation theorems have also appealed to ethically neutral propositions. The notion of ethical neutrality has often been called into question — in fact, there seem to be good reasons to suppose that no ethically neutral propositions exist. In this paper, I present several new, Ramsey-inspired representation theorems that avoid any appeal to ethical neutrality. These theorems preserve the benefits of Ramsey's system, without paying the cost of ethical neutrality.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) Elliott 2016. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record, 'Elliott, EJR (2017) Ramsey Without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem. Mind, 126 (501). pp. 1-51,' is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv180 |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 01 Sep 2016 14:57 |
Last Modified: | 14 Oct 2018 00:38 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv180 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/mind/fzv180 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:102258 |