Williams, JRG orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2017) Indeterminate Oughts. Ethics, 127. pp. 645-673. ISSN 0014-1704
Abstract
Sometimes it is indeterminate what an agent morally ought do. This generates a Decision Ought Challenge — to give moral guidance to agents in such a scenario. This paper is a field guide to the options for a theory of the decision - ought for cases of indeterminacy. Three categories of view are evaluated, and the best representative for each is identified.
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 by The University of Chicago. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Leeds | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications | ||||
Date Deposited: | 09 Nov 2016 11:30 | ||||
Last Modified: | 17 Mar 2018 01:39 | ||||
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1086/690071 | ||||
Status: | Published | ||||
Publisher: | University of Chicago Press | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1086/690071 |