Maimonides’ Austere Quietism

Abstract Maimonides claims that knowledge of God is negative knowledge, expressible through negations. He further claims that this negative knowledge varies in degree. Maimonides introduces this latter claim through the use of a parable in his Guide of the Perplexed, Book 1, Chapter 60. We show that this parable is unable to serve the function which Maimonides introduces it to serve. We argue that the parable, and the position it supposedly illustrates, is a rhetorical device which points us towards Maimonides’ proper position. This is the quietist view that there is knowledge of God which cannot be expressed in language. This quietism is austere because Maimonides refuses to attempt to express such knowledge through rhetorical devices. We account for the failure of Maimonides’ parable and its tension with other parts of the Guide through appeal to the fifth source of contradiction outlined in the Guide’s Introduction. Our position is complicated by the fact that Maimonides does not explicitly endorse quietism. We argue that due to the inexpressibility proper to quietism and his theory of reference, Maimonides is as explicit in his endorsement as he can be. This discussion offers a novel reading of the parable in I.60 and also serves as a further argument in favour of the non-skeptical reading of Maimonides. We engage with the work of Lorberbaum, Lobel, Blumenthal, Kars, and Benor, among others.