Lillehammer, H. (2025) Moral praise and moral performance. European Journal of Philosophy. e13066. ISSN 0966-8373
Abstract
According to some, luck forms an inevitable part of admirable moral agency. According to others, it is incompatible with a basic principle of moral worth. What's the issue? Is there a ‘problem’ of moral luck; or are there many, or none? With reference to the practice of moral praise, I suggest that there is no single problem of moral luck as traditionally understood. Instead, there is a family of issues regarding the interpretation and assessment of moral performance. In the background is a mixture of descriptive and normative issues, including how to understand the legitimacy of social expectations, the value of effort, and the duties of communities to enable their members to live good and virtuous lives.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2025 The Author(s). European Journal of Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | Moral Luck; Moral Responsibility; Praise; Blame |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > School of History, Philosophy and Digital Humanities |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 14 Mar 2025 12:22 |
Last Modified: | 24 Mar 2025 09:26 |
Status: | Published online |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/ejop.13066 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:224222 |
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