Connolly, N. (2022) Fictional Resistance and Real Feelings. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 11 (2). pp. 106-113. ISSN 2161-2234
Abstract
This paper outlines a solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance that makes—and if successful helps to vindicate—two assumptions. The solution first assumes a relationship between moral judgements and affective states of the subject. It also assumes the correctness of accounts of imaginative engagement with fiction—like Kendall Walton’s account—that treat engagement with fiction as prop-based make-believe in which works of fiction, but also appreciators of those works, figure as props. The key to understanding imaginative resistance, it maintains, is understanding how real feelings become part of fictional worlds.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Thought Trust. This Open Access article is distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License. (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
Keywords: | imaginative resistance; moral sentimentalism; fiction; make-believe |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 03 Mar 2023 12:09 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 14:09 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.5840/tht202322810 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:197005 |