Allen, Keith Malcolm orcid.org/0000-0002-3219-2102 (2019) Merleau-Ponty and Naive Realism. Philosophers' Imprint. pp. 1-25. ISSN 1533-628X
Abstract
ABSTRACT: This paper has two aims. The first is to use contemporary discussions of naïve realist theories of perception to offer an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. The second is to use consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception to outline a distinctive version of a naïve realist theory of perception. In a Merleau-Pontian spirit, these two aims are inter-dependent.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Keith Allen |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 16 Feb 2018 15:40 |
Last Modified: | 18 Mar 2025 00:07 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:127617 |
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Filename: merleau_ponty_and_naive_realism.pdf
Description: merleau-ponty-and-naive-realism
Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 2.5