Shalkowski, SA (2017) Modal Epistemology Without Detours. In: Fischer, R and Leon, F, (eds.) Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library, 378 . Springer International Publishing , Cham, Switzerland , pp. 47-66. ISBN 978-3-319-44307-2
Abstract
Many common approaches to modality pose problems for accounts of modal knowledge that are no less severe than those thought to plague David Lewis’s account in terms of a plurality of concrete worlds. Typically, these theories are framed in terms of the wrong kinds of thing and their defenders misdiagnose the failings of Lewis’s plurality. These considerations provide the foundations for modalist accounts of modal knowledge, where modality is not primarily a matter of recherché objects.
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Item Type: | Book Section |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Synthese Library. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_4. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | modality; epistemology; integration; Benacerraf; Lewis; ersatzism |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 04 Oct 2016 09:34 |
Last Modified: | 14 Apr 2021 09:12 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer International Publishing |
Series Name: | Synthese Library |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_4 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:94796 |