Byerly, T.R. (2013) The Special Value of Epistemic Self-Reliance. Ratio, 27 (1). pp. 53-67. ISSN 0034-0006
Abstract
Philosophers have long held that epistemic self-reliance has a special value. But, this view has recently been challenged by prominent epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski argues that potential sources of support for the claim that epistemic self-reliance has a special value fail. Here I provide a novel defense of the special value of epistemic self-reliance. Self-reliance has a special value because it is required for attaining certain valuable cognitive achievements. Further, practicing self-reliance may be all-things-considered worthwhile even when doing so is a less reliable way of getting to the truth than relying on others and even when doing so is flatly unreliable in getting to the truth.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2013 Wiley. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in JOURNAL. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 26 Feb 2016 11:33 |
Last Modified: | 26 Feb 2016 11:33 |
Published Version: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12016 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/rati.12016 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:94258 |