Caves, RLJ (2018) Emergence for Nihilists. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99 (1). pp. 2-28. ISSN 0279-0750
Abstract
I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are ‘something over and above’ the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist’s ontology to instantiate emergent properties – or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples (taken together) can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist’s ontology can in fact accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist’s ontology or ideology.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018, The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. © 2015, University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: "Caves, R. L. J. (2015) Emergence for Nihilists. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly" which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12148. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
Keywords: | nihilism; emergence; metaphysics; ontology; composition; mereology; mind; consciousness; quantum mechanics |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 26 Nov 2015 10:02 |
Last Modified: | 13 Mar 2018 09:35 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/papq.12148 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:92249 |