Saatsi, JT orcid.org/0000-0002-8440-8761 (2016) On the 'Indispensable Explanatory Role' of Mathematics. Mind, 125 (500). pp. 1045-1070. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
The literature on the indispensability argument for mathematical realism often refers to the ‘indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics. I argue that we should examine the notion of explanatory indispensability from the point of view of specific conceptions of scientific explanation. The reason is that explanatory indispensability in and of itself turns out to be insufficient for justifying the ontological conclusions at stake. To show this I introduce a distinction between different kinds of explanatory roles—some ‘thick’ and ontologically committing, others ‘thin’ and ontologically peripheral—and examine this distinction in relation to some notable ‘ontic’ accounts of explanation. I also discuss the issue in the broader context of other ‘explanationist’ realist arguments.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016, Saatsi. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record 'Saatsi, JT (2016) On the 'Indispensable Explanatory Role' of Mathematics. Mind.' is available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv175. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 29 Oct 2015 14:15 |
Last Modified: | 08 Jul 2018 00:38 |
Published Version: | http://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv175 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/mind/fzv175 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:91259 |