Saatsi, J orcid.org/0000-0002-8440-8761 (2019) Historical inductions, Old and New. Synthese, 196 (10). pp. 3979-3993. ISSN 0039-7857
Abstract
I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Synthese. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The final publication is available at Springer via https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0855-5. |
Keywords: | Realism; Pessimistic induction; Stanford |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 29 Oct 2015 14:22 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 08:57 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11229-015-0855-5 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:91258 |