Bauso, D. and Timmer, J. (2009) Robust dynamic cooperative games. International Journal of Game Theory, 38. 23 - 36. ISSN 0020-7276
Abstract
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. We consider a dynamic context where at each point in time the coalitional values are unknown but bounded by a polyhedron. However, the average value of each coalition in the long run is known with certainty. We design “robust” allocation rules for this context, which are allocation rules that keep the coalition excess bounded while guaranteeing each player a certain average allocation (over time). We also present a joint replenishment application to motivate our model.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2008 Springer International Publishing. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in International Journal of Game Theory. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Cooperative games; Dynamic games; Joint replenishment |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 04 Feb 2016 14:59 |
Last Modified: | 09 Mar 2016 00:49 |
Published Version: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0138-1 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s00182-008-0138-1 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:89746 |