Bauso, D. and Timmer, J. (2012) On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games. Automatica, 48 (10). 2592 - 2596. ISSN 0005-1098
Abstract
In this paper we investigate robustness and dynamics for coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU games). In particular we study sequences of TU games. These sequences model dynamic situations in which the values of coalitions of players are not known beforehand, and are subject to changes over time. An allocation rule assigns a payoff to each player in each time period. This payoff is bounded by external restrictions, for example due to contractual agreements. Our main questions are: (i) under which conditions do the allocations converge to a core-element of the game, and (ii) when do the allocations converge to some specific allocation, the so-called nominal allocation? The main contribution of this paper is a design method for allocation rules that return solutions in the core or ε-core of the game under delayed information on the coalitions’ values, and therefore the resulting allocation rule is called robust.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2012 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Automatica. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
Keywords: | Cooperative game theory; Coalitional games with transferable utilities; Robust allocation processes; Core |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 11 Sep 2015 13:49 |
Last Modified: | 29 Mar 2018 01:06 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2012.06.057 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.automatica.2012.06.057 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:89715 |