Mobilia, M (2013) Evolutionary games with facilitators: When does selection favor cooperation? Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 56. pp. 113-123. ISSN 0960-0779
Abstract
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy (“cooperation” and “defection”) games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that support cooperation by enhancing the reproductive potential of cooperators relative to the fitness of defectors. By computing the fixation probability of a single cooperator in finite and well-mixed populations that include a fixed number of facilitators, and by using mean field analysis, we determine when selection promotes cooperation in the important classes of prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games. In particular, we identify the circumstances under which selection favors the replacement and invasion of defection by cooperation. Our findings, corroborated by stochastic simulations, show that the spread of cooperation can be promoted through various scenarios when the density of facilitators exceeds a critical value whose dependence on the population size and selection strength is analyzed. We also determine under which conditions cooperation is more likely to replace defection than vice versa.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences (Leeds) > School of Mathematics (Leeds) > Applied Mathematics (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 09 Aug 2016 11:46 |
Last Modified: | 20 Jan 2018 08:19 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.011 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.011 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:87665 |