Bueno, O, Shalkowski, SA and Busch, J (2015) The No-Category Ontology. The Monist, 98 (3). pp. 233-245. ISSN 0026-9662
Abstract
In this paper we argue that there are no categories of being⎯at least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence. We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe’s [2006] four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology, which dispenses with any fundamental categories of being, and provides a deflationary understanding of any categorization in terms of concepts. Concepts, we insist, as opposed to fundamental ontological categories, can always be revised, refined, and recast. A distinctive deflationary, no-category ontology then emerges.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015, This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Monist following peer review. The version of record "Bueno, O, Shalkowski, SA and Busch, J (2015) The No-Category Ontology. The Monist, 98 (3). pp. 233-245" is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv014. |
Keywords: | Categories; metaphysics; ontology |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 29 May 2015 10:39 |
Last Modified: | 31 Jul 2017 19:24 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv014 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/monist/onv014 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:86530 |