Bueno, O and Shalkowski, SA (2015) Modalism and theoretical virtues: Toward an epistemology of modality. Philosophical Studies, 172 (3). pp. 671-689. ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
According to modalism, modality is primitive. In this paper, we examine the implications of this view for modal epistemology, and articulate a modalist account of modal knowledge. First, we discuss a theoretical utility argument used by David Lewis in support of his claim that there is a plurality of concrete worlds. We reject this argument, and show how to dispense with possible worlds altogether. We proceed to account for modal knowledge in modalist terms.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Studies. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0327-7 |
Keywords: | modality; modalism; modal epistemology; theoretical virtues |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 27 Mar 2015 11:58 |
Last Modified: | 19 Nov 2020 10:44 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11098-014-0327-7 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:83720 |