Saatsi, JT and Pexton, M (2013) Reassessing Woodward's account of explanation: regularities, counterfactuals, and non-causal explanations. Philosophy of Science: official journal of the Philosophy of Science Association, 80 (5). 613 - 624. ISSN 0031-8248
Abstract
We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in relation to regularity explananda. Woodward presents an account of causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to illustrate, that the account can also cover some noncausal explanations. This leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory power in connection with regularity explananda.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2015 13:53 |
Last Modified: | 13 May 2015 22:43 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/673899 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Philosophy of Science Association |
Identification Number: | 10.1086/673899 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:81769 |