Vayrynen, P (2008) Some good and bad news for ethical intuitionism. Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (232). 489 - 511. ISSN 0031-8094
Abstract
The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2008, Wiley-Blackwell. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Quarterly. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | moral knowledge; moral perception; foundationalism; non-inferential; analyticity; intuitionism; self-evidence |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 14 Nov 2013 11:43 |
Last Modified: | 29 Mar 2018 16:15 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.528.x |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.528.x |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:76779 |