Vayrynen, P (2009) Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials. Philosophical Perspectives, 23 (1). 439 - 469. ISSN 1520-8583
Abstract
So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also briefly considers contextualist, presuppositional, and implicature accounts of the evaluative contents of thick concepts, but finds none clearly superior to the others.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2009, Wiley-Blackwell. Reproduced with permission from the publisher. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Vayrynen, P (2009) Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials. Philosophical Perspectives, 23 (1). 439 - 469. ISSN 1520-8583 which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00179.x |
Keywords: | Thick concepts; Moral semantics; Disagreement; Moral language |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 15 Nov 2013 12:12 |
Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2014 02:50 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00179.x |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00179.x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:76778 |