Lang, G (2009) Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 6 (3). 317 - 338 . ISSN 1740-4681
Abstract
In this article, I appeal to the phenomenon of moral hazard in order to explain how at least some of the inequalities permitted by Luck Egalitarianism can be given an alternative, more plausible grounding than that which is supplied by Luck Egalitarianism. This alternative grounding robs Luck Egalitarianism of a potentially significant source of intuitive support whilst enabling conditional welfare policies to survive the attacks on them made by Elizabeth Anderson, Jonathan Wolff, and others.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Keywords: | brute luck, inequality, luck egalitarianism, moral hazard |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jan 2012 12:28 |
Last Modified: | 04 Nov 2016 02:39 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552409X433418 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Brill Academic Publishers |
Identification Number: | 10.1163/174552409X433418 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:43549 |
Download not available
A full text copy of this item is not currently available from White Rose Research Online