Williams, J.R.G. (2008) Chances, counterfactuals and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (2). pp. 385-420. ISSN 1933-1592
Abstract
John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2008 International Phenomenological Society. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Leeds Philosophy Department |
Date Deposited: | 02 Nov 2007 18:38 |
Last Modified: | 16 Sep 2016 13:32 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00196.x |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | International Phenomenological Society |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00196.x |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3357 |