French, S.R.D. (2003) A model-theoretic account of representation (or, I don't know much about art … but I know it involves isomorphism). Philosophy of Science, 70 (5). pp. 1472-1483. ISSN 0031-8248
Abstract
Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such examples need to be handled with care given a) the differences between works of art and scientific theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and, moreover, allow us to understand how ‘‘impossible’’ artistic objects and inconsistent scientific theories can be said to represent.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2003 University of Chicago Press. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) > Division of the History and Philosophy of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Leeds Philosophy Department |
Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2007 11:32 |
Last Modified: | 16 Sep 2016 13:32 |
Published Version: | http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/PHILSCI/journal/i... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3345 |