Cameron, R.P. (2005) Truthmaker necessitarianism and maximalism. Logique et Analyse, 48. pp. 43-56. ISSN 0024-5836
Abstract
In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Logique-et-Analyse. Uploaded with permission from the publisher. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Leeds Philosophy Department |
Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2007 12:01 |
Last Modified: | 28 Oct 2016 10:50 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | National Centre for Logical Investigation |
Refereed: | Yes |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3217 |