Pilgrim, C., Bate, A.M., Sigalou, A. et al. (6 more authors) (2026) Many-eyes and sentinels in selfish and cooperative groups. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 123 (33). ISSN: 0027-8424
Abstract
Collective vigilance describes how animals in groups benefit from the predator detection efforts of others. Empirical observations typically find either a many-eyes strategy with all (or many) group members maintaining a low level of individual vigilance, or a sentinel strategy with one (or a few) individuals maintaining a high level of individual vigilance while others do not. With an analytical treatment that makes minimal assumptions, we show that these two strategies are alternative solutions to the same adaptive problem of balancing the costs of predation and vigilance. Which strategy is preferred depends on how costs scale with the level of individual vigilance: Many-eyes strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise gently at low levels but become steeper at higher levels (convex; e.g., an open field); sentinel strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise steeply at low levels and then flatten out (concave; e.g., environments with vantage points). This same dichotomy emerges whether individuals act selfishly to optimize their own fitness or cooperatively to optimize group fitness. The model is extended to explain discrete behavioral switching between strategies, differential levels of vigilance such as edge effects, and turn-taking.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Authors/Creators: |
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| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2026 the Author(s). This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Keywords: | collective vigilance; collective intelligence; cooperation; behavioral ecology; evolution |
| Dates: |
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| Institution: | The University of Leeds |
| Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences (Leeds) > School of Mathematics (Leeds) > Statistics (Leeds) |
| Funding Information: | Funder Grant number Templeton World Charity Foundation UR FAO GR533391 |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Jul 2026 15:49 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Sep 2026 15:31 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | National Academy of Sciences |
| Identification Number: | 10.1073/pnas.2536017123 |
| Related URLs: | |
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:242703 |

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