Ignorantly Arrogant Souls: Looking Back at U.S./UN Control Over North Korea in the Autumn of 1950

Purpose—This study will revisit and update the literature on the United States–led occupation of North Korea and explore the reasons for its failure, examining three key aspects: unclear direction and authority, prevalent extrajudicial violence, and widespread antipathy towards citizens residing in the occupied territory.

Approach—This article has deployed archival research and other primary documents juxtaposed against a wide range of existing literature.

Findings—This study first establishes what went wrong during the occupation of North Korean territory between October and December 1950, then determines which mistakes could have been avoided by allied authorities, demonstrating that the occupation of North Korea was subject to a series of unforced errors which substantially degraded the legitimacy of the overall United Nations effort in Korea.

Originality—By incorporating new documents from UK archives, CIA digital collections, and some U.S. military papers, this article advances our understanding of the United States–led occupation of North Korea.