Bradley, D. (2025) Higher-Order Evidence and Normative Contextualism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 54 (6). 438 -450. ISSN: 0045-5091
Abstract
How should you respond to higher-order evidence which says that you have made a mistake in the reasoning from your first-order evidence? It is highly plausible that you should reduce your confidence in your first-order reasoning. However, attempts to precisely formulate how this works have run into problems. I will argue that we should appeal to an independently motivated normative contextualism. That is, normative words like ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ have a different reference in different contexts. The result is that different answers to our question are true in different contexts.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Authors/Creators: |
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| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2025. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Keywords: | higher-order evidence, normative contextualism, calibrationism, disagreement, subjective and objective reasons |
| Dates: |
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| Institution: | The University of Leeds |
| Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
| Funding Information: | Funder Grant number John Templeton Foundation (US) ID# 62603 |
| Date Deposited: | 19 May 2025 09:43 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Feb 2026 16:20 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
| Identification Number: | 10.1017/can.2025.10006 |
| Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:226797 |
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