Jamali, M., Sadabadi, M.S., Davari, M. et al. (2 more authors) (2025) Resilient-by-design control for in situ primary controller of grid-following inverter-based resources by a novel state augmentation to tolerate false data injection cyberattacks. IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics, 40 (2). pp. 2746-2760. ISSN 0885-8993
Abstract
With the increasing number of three-phase grid-following (GFL) inverter-based resources (IBRs) in modern power grids deploying cyber-physical systems, they are required to possess more intelligence with diverse functionality and communication capabilities. However, the cyber threats of smart inverters are omnipresent due to the immense usage of data and communication devices. This paper proposes a novel resilient vector current control strategy for GFL IBRs to alleviate the destructive impacts of false data injection (FDI) attacks while ensuring the stability and desired performance of GFL IBRs. Even with proper upper-layer control mechanisms in place, attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in GFL IBR's primary control, specifically 'inverter output controller.' In such cases, FDI attacks can manipulate the control commands sent to the pulse width modulator, thereby adversely impacting the quality of the output power. To this end, auxiliary control states are augmented and incorporated into the state feedback controller of GFL IBRs, thus enhancing resilient performance against FDI attacks. Theoretical analysis using Lyapunov theory and matrix properties rigorously supports the proof of stability and extends control design considerations. Comparative simulations and experimental results illustrate the resilience and effective functionality of the proposed control scheme.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2024 The Authors. Except as otherwise noted, this author-accepted version of a journal article published in IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics is made available via the University of Sheffield Research Publications and Copyright Policy under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
Keywords: | Microprogramming; Inverters; Power grids; Microgrids; Cyberattack; Vectors; Mathematical models |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 08 Nov 2024 15:01 |
Last Modified: | 25 Feb 2025 15:53 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1109/tpel.2024.3465467 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:219398 |