Bradley, D. (2025) Contextualism and the truth norm. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. ISSN 1742-3600
Abstract
What should we believe? One plausible view is that we should believe what is true. Another is that we should believe what is rational to believe. I will argue that both these theses can be accounted for once we add an independently motivated contextualism about normative terms. According to contextualism, the content of ‘ought’ depends on two parameters – a goal and a modal base (or set of possible worlds). It follows that there is a sense in which we should believe truths and a sense in which we should believe what is rational to believe.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2025. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | Truth norm, rationality norm, contextualism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number John Templeton Foundation (US) ID# 62603 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 22 Aug 2024 14:52 |
Last Modified: | 21 Mar 2025 10:26 |
Status: | Published online |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/epi.2024.39 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:216327 |