Neither ‘underpinning’ nor ‘overarching’: explicating a critically reciprocal philosophy of religious studies

One conception of philosophy’s role vis-à-vis religious studies is that of uncovering the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of approaches such as the history, psychology, or sociology of religion. Bernard Lonergan, for example, regarded philosophy of religion as ‘underpinning’ and ‘overarching’ other approaches; hence Jim Kanaris designated Lonergan’s conception of philosophy of religion a ‘philosophy of religious studies’. Without simply rejecting the latter conception, this article explicates an alternative, according to which philosophy of religion has much to learn from other approaches. Indeed, attentiveness to empirical studies is one means of overcoming a fixation on an abstract ‘theism’. Engaging critically though sympathetically with work by Kevin Schilbrack and Timothy Knepper, and expounding the notion of critical description in philosophy of religion, the article makes conceptual space for a critically reciprocal philosophy of religious studies; this downplays the evaluation of ‘religious reason-giving’ while emphasizing self-criticality and reflection upon interdisciplinary methods.