Graf, S. (2023) Permissive Divergence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 53 (3). 240 -255. ISSN 0045-5091
Abstract
Within collective epistemology, there is a class of theories that understand the epistemic status of collective attitude ascriptions, such as “the college union knows that the industrial action is going to plan” as saying that a sufficient subset of group member attitudes has the relevant epistemic status. I will demonstrate that these summativist approaches to collective epistemology are incompatible with epistemic permissivism, the doctrine that a single body of evidence may rationalize multiple doxastic attitudes. In particular, we can use epistemic permissivism to generate so-called divergence cases, which demonstrate situations in which rationality requires group-level and member-level attitudes to diverge.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Canadian Journal of Philosophy Inc. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. |
Keywords: | collective epistemology; divergence arguments; group belief; permissivism; summativism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 13 Mar 2024 11:49 |
Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2024 10:12 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/can.2024.4 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:210211 |