Wilson, A. orcid.org/0000-0003-3027-5016 (Cover date: December 2021) Counterpossible Reasoning in Physics. Philosophy of Science, 88 (5). pp. 1113-1124. ISSN 0031-8248
Abstract
This article explores three ways in which physics may involve counterpossible reasoning. The first way arises when evaluating false theories: to say what the world would be like if the theory were true, we need to evaluate counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents. The second way relates to the role of counterfactuals in characterizing causal structure: to say what causes what in physics, we need to make reference to physically impossible scenarios. The third way is novel: to model metaphysical dependence in physics, we need to consider counterfactual consequences of metaphysical impossibilities. Physics accordingly bears substantial and surprising counterpossible commitments.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This article has been published in a revised form in [https://doi.org/10.1086/714706]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 09 Nov 2023 14:22 |
Last Modified: | 14 Nov 2023 15:24 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
Identification Number: | 10.1086/714706 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:205106 |