Williams, J.R.G orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2023) Affect, Desire and Interpretation. Philosophical Studies, 180 (9). pp. 2871-2893. ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
Are interpersonal comparisons of desire possible? Can we give an account of how facts about desires are grounded that underpins such comparisons? This paper supposes the answer to the first question is yes, and provides an account of the nature of desire that explains how this is so. The account is a modification of the interpretationist metaphysics of representation that the author has recently been developing. The modification is to allow phenomenological affective valence into the “base facts” on which correct interpretation is grounded. To use this extra resource within that theory to vindicate interpersonal comparisons, we will need to appeal rational connections between level of valence and level of desire, which this paper sets out and examines.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2023. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | Desire, Interpretation, Utility, Rationality, Affect |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number EU - European Union 818633 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2023 13:05 |
Last Modified: | 10 Dec 2024 16:07 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11098-023-02000-x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:200916 |