“Small, yet beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Chowdhury, S.M. Kim, S.-H. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6171-5382
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2017 Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Keywords:	Contest design; Multiple winner; Group-size; Selection mechanism
Dates:	Published: July 2017 Published (online): 3 June 2017
Institution:	The University of Sheffield
Academic Units:	The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited:	01 Jun 2023 14:03
Last Modified:	01 Jun 2023 14:03
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Elsevier BV
Refereed:	Yes
Identification Number:	10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
Related URLs:	Author
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:199698

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“Small, yet beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

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