Bradley, D (2024) Can We have Justified Beliefs about Fundamental Properties? The Philosophical Quarterly, 74 (1). pp. 46-67. ISSN 0031-8094
Abstract
An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2023. This is an author produced version of an article published in Philosophical Quarterly. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | metaphysical fundamentality, epistemic fundamentality, scrutability, similarity, probability |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 12 Apr 2023 09:20 |
Last Modified: | 24 Feb 2025 01:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/pq/pqad012 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:198110 |