Bradley, D (2023) Reasons for Belief in Context. Episteme. pp. 1-16. ISSN 1742-3600
Abstract
There is currently a lively debate about whether there are practical reasons for belief, epistemic reasons for belief, or both. I will argue that the intuitions on all sides can be fully accounted for by applying an independently motivated contextualist semantics for normative terms. Specifically, normative terms must be relativized to a goal. One possible goal is epistemic, such as believing truly and not believing falsely, while another possible goal is practical, such as satisfying desires, or maximizing value. I will argue that we have practical reasons given the practical goal and epistemic reasons given the epistemic goal. Disagreement disappears when we make the context explicit. The result is an independently motivated version of pluralism.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2023. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. |
Keywords: | Practical reasons; epistemic reasons; normative contextualism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number John Templeton Foundation (US) ID# 62603 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 12 Apr 2023 09:08 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2023 16:42 |
Status: | Published online |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:198109 |