Shaw, A orcid.org/0000-0001-7559-3224 (2020) Desire and Satisfaction. The Philosophical Quarterly, 70 (279). pp. 371-384. ISSN 0031-8094
Abstract
Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their own persistence’, a problem posed by Shieva Kleinschmidt, Kris McDaniel, and Ben Bradley. The solution undercuts a key motivation for rejecting the standard view in favour of more radical accounts proposed in the literature.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: | |
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. This is an author produced version of an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | desire, conditional desire, satisfaction, propositional attitude, propositional content |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2022 14:30 |
Last Modified: | 20 Oct 2022 19:00 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/pq/pqz068 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:192261 |