Gamester, W orcid.org/0000-0003-4376-4433 (2023) Nothing is true. Journal of Philosophy, 120 (6). pp. 314-338. ISSN 0022-362X
Abstract
This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that the utility of the truth predicate is exhausted by its expressive role, and I argue that the truth predicate can still play this expressive role even if nothing is true. As such, deflationists do not stand to lose anything by accepting nihilism. Since they also stand to gain an elegant solution to the alethic paradoxes, on balance deflationists ought to be nihilists.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Ⓒ The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. This is an author produced version of a article published in Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number British Academy PF2\180082 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 20 Sep 2022 15:33 |
Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2024 00:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Philosophy Documentation Center |
Identification Number: | 10.5840/jphil2023120612 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:190974 |