Beebee, H orcid.org/0000-0001-7650-3622 (2018) I—The Presidential Address: Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 118 (1). pp. 1-24. ISSN 0066-7374
Abstract
I define ‘philosophical scepticism’ as the view that philosophers do not and cannot know many of the substantive philosophical claims that they make or implicitly assume. I argue for philosophical scepticism via the ‘methodology challenge’ and the ‘disagreement challenge’. I claim that the right response to philosophical scepticism is to abandon the view that philosophy aims at knowledge, and (borrowing from David Lewis) to replace it with a more modest aim: that of finding ‘equilibria’ that ‘can withstand examination’. Finally, I consider what our attitude to our own philosophical theses should be.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 The Aristotelian Society. This is an author produced version of an article published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 09 Dec 2022 13:49 |
Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2022 10:55 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/arisoc/aox017 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:183980 |