Beebee, H orcid.org/0000-0001-7650-3622 (2001) Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 51 (204). pp. 356-374. ISSN 0031-8094
Abstract
Martin Davies argues that ‘limitation principles’ block the transfer of warrant from the premises of a certain kind of argument to its conclusion. The class of arguments in question includes Moore's argument for the existence of the external world, and a popular style of argument which starts from two premises that are warranted by first‐person authority and semantic externalism respectively, ending with a conclusion that does not, allegedly, admit of a priori justification. I argue that the relevant class of arguments can be shown to be unconvincing without appealing to any limitation principles, by showing that they beg the question against sceptical opponents. Principles limiting the transfer of warrant are not required in order to rebut the claim that first‐person authority and semantic externalism are incompatible.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2001. This is an author produced version of an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 15 Dec 2022 12:52 |
Last Modified: | 17 Dec 2022 01:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/1467-9213.00234 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:183839 |