Beebee, H orcid.org/0000-0001-7650-3622 and Mele, A (2002) Humean Compatibilism. Mind, 111 (442). pp. 201-224. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are ‘up to us’ and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism—the consequence argument—has a false premiss. We also display some striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism, an incompatibilist view. For example, standard libertarians face a problem about luck, and we show that Humean compatibilists face a very similar problem.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Copyright Oxford University Press 2002 This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record Beebee, H and Mele, A (2002) Humean Compatibilism. Mind, 111 (442). pp. 201-224. ISSN 0026-4423 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/111/442/201/1010049?login=true https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/111.442.201 |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 03 Jan 2023 16:02 |
Last Modified: | 04 Jan 2023 12:28 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/mind/111.442.201 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:183836 |