Beebee, H orcid.org/0000-0001-7650-3622 (2007) The Two Definitions and the Doctrine of Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107 (1pt3). pp. 413-431. ISSN 0066-7374
Abstract
Peter Millican claims that Hume's argument for the doctrine of necessity in §VIII of the first Enquiry is a ‘torpedo into the core’ of the sceptical realist interpretation of Hume. I argue against this claim: Hume's argument in fact provides no new evidence for or against any of the standard interpretative positions.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | ©2007 The Aristotelian Society. This is an author produced version of an article published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 09 Dec 2022 11:35 |
Last Modified: | 10 Dec 2022 01:37 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00231.x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:183829 |