Bradley, D (2023) The Explanatory Power of Deflationary Truth. Erkenntnis, 88. pp. 3439-3456. ISSN 0165-0106
Abstract
It is widely believed that deflationary truth has no explanatory power. I will argue that it does. Specifically, I will consider some objections to deflationary truth having explanatory power, and argue that they fail. The position which will emerge is that the deflationary concept of truth is analogous to the concept of an average. Scientists take averages to be explanatory, and I will argue that the concept of deflationary truth is explanatory in the same way. I then argue that this deflationary concept of truth motivates a theory of the property of truth which is metaphysically disunified, but that this is no obstacle to explanation. This leads to a way of understanding the deflationary/substantive distinction in terms of grounding.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2022, The Author(s). This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 29 Nov 2021 13:35 |
Last Modified: | 26 Oct 2023 10:00 |
Published Version: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-0... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s10670-021-00510-w |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:180711 |