Santorio, P and Williams, JRG orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2022) Indeterminacy and Triviality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100 (4). pp. 727-742. ISSN 0004-8402
Abstract
Suppose you’re certain that a claim—say, ‘Frida is tall’—does not have a determinate truth value. What attitude should you take towards it? This is the question of the cognitive role of indeterminacy. This paper presents a puzzle for theories of cognitive role. Many of these theories vindicate a seemingly plausible principle: if you are fully certain that A, you are rationally required to be fully certain that A is determinate. Call this principle ‘Certainty’. We show that Certainty, in combination with some minimal side premises, entails a very implausible claim: whenever you’re certain that it’s indeterminate whether A, it is rationally required that you reject A. This is a surprising result, which requires abandoning at least some intuitive views about indeterminacy and cognitive role.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2022 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. This is an author produced version of an article published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | indeterminacy; cognitive role; credence; triviality |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 01 Jul 2021 11:19 |
Last Modified: | 17 Sep 2023 00:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00048402.2021.1936092 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:175650 |