Väyrynen, P orcid.org/0000-0003-4066-8577 (2021) Against Moral Contingentism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 10 (3). pp. 209-217. ISSN 2161-2234
Abstract
The conventional wisdom in ethics is that pure moral laws are at least metaphysically necessary. By contrast, Moral Contingentism holds that pure moral laws are metaphysically contingent, and at most normatively necessary. This paper raises a normative objection to Moral Contingentism: it is worse equipped than Moral Necessitarianism to account for the normative standing or authority of the pure moral laws to govern the lives of the agents to whom they apply. Since morality is widely taken to have such a standing, failing to account for it would be a significant problem. The objection also shows that the debate about the modal status of moral principles isn't a debate solely within modal metaphysics, but has implications for topics in moral philosophy.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 The Author. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy published by The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 12 May 2021 09:56 |
Last Modified: | 13 Jan 2023 14:43 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Identification Number: | 10.1002/tht3.494 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:173592 |