A minimalist explanation of Truth's asymmetry

Abstract

Suppose that Eleanor is drowsy. Truth's asymmetry is illustrated by the following fact: while we accept that is true because Eleanor is drowsy, we do not accept that Eleanor is drowsy because is true. This asymmetry requires an explanation, but it has been alleged, notably by David Liggins, that the minimalist about truth cannot provide one. This paper counteracts this pessimism by arguing that the minimalist can successfully explain the asymmetry conceptually, rather than metaphysically. It then goes on to defend this account against objections, in the end concluding that explaining truth's asymmetry is no problem for the minimalist.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Dodd, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1737-7616
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2018 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is an author produced version of a journal article published in American Philosophical Quarterly. The final published version is available here: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/index.html. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Dates:	Accepted: 12 July 2017 Published: 1 October 2018
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	14 Dec 2020 14:28
Last Modified:	20 Apr 2025 05:14
Published Version:	https://www.jstor.org/stable/45128633
Status:	Published
Publisher:	University of Illinois Press
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:168950

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A minimalist explanation of Truth's asymmetry

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