Elliott, E orcid.org/0000-0002-4387-7967 (2022) What Is ‘Real’ in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100 (1). pp. 102-116. ISSN 0004-8402
Abstract
According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In two recent AJP papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose: specifically, we should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. This is an author produced version of an article published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | comparativism; confidence; degrees of belief; interpersonal comparisons; measurement |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 11 Dec 2020 13:26 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jul 2022 14:19 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00048402.2020.1849326 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:168915 |