Isserow, J orcid.org/0000-0001-5900-8363 (2020) Moral Worth: Having it Both Ways. Journal of Philosophy, 117 (10). pp. 529-556. ISSN 0022-362X
Abstract
It is commonly recognized that one can act rightly without being praiseworthy for doing so. Those who act rightly from ignoble motives, for instance, do not strike us as fitting targets of moral praise; their actions seem to lack moral worth. Though there is broad agreement that only certain kinds of motives confer moral worth on our actions, there is disagreement as to which ones are up to the task. Many theorists confine themselves to two possibilities: praiseworthy agents are thought to be motivated by either (1) the consideration that their actions are morally right, or (2) the considerations that explain why their actions are morally right (where the ‘or’ is exclusive). Though there is an important element of truth in these proposals, each has limited explanatory purchase. In this paper, I develop a pluralist conception of moral worth that acknowledges both sorts of motives as grounds for moral praise.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. This is an author produced version of an article published in The Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 13 Nov 2020 13:31 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2021 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Journal of Philosophy |
Identification Number: | 10.5840/jphil20201171035 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:167886 |