Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism

Abstract

An important line of response to scepticism appeals to the best explanation. But anti-sceptics have not engaged much with work on explanation in the philosophy of science. I plan to investigate whether plausible assumptions about best explanations really do favour anti-scepticism. I will argue that there are ways of constructing sceptical hypotheses in which the assumptions do favour anti-scepticism, but the size of the support for anti-scepticism is small.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Bradley, D
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Keywords:	Scepticism abductivism; best explanation; Principles of Indifference; objective Bayesianism
Dates:	Accepted: 11 October 2020 Published (online): 24 February 2021 Published: March 2024
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Funding Information:	Funder Grant number British Academy MD19\190046
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	16 Oct 2020 14:43
Last Modified:	20 Aug 2024 11:46
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Identification Number:	10.1017/epi.2020.54
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:166648

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Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism

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